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Abstract: The aim of this study is to introduce a novel reasoning phenomenon concerned with the shallow processing of 
negation in the context of sentential reasoning. By analogy to other psychological explanations that account for superficial 
responses with conditionals, this study proposes an account for biconditionals derived from a recent theory of negation. This 
theory predicts that the psychological use of negation returns small scope products. This would happen because the human 
mind tends to avoid the working memory overload by simplifying its reasoning processes. A within-subjects experimental 
design was applied to test this conjecture. Results were consistent with such small scope negation prediction. The obtained 
evidence extends the observation of shallow reasoning processes to the negation of conjunctions and disjunctions that take 
the form of biconditionals. The results of this study support a mental models approach to account for the psychology of 
logical negation.  
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1. Introduction 
Deductive reasoning is hard for humans [1]. Even simple 
deductive tasks often yield low performances [2]. This 
would probably happen because the human mind does not 
seem to work according to the rules of logic [3]. The 
psychological processing of deduction, in contrast, would 
proceed by representing mental simulations inferred from 
given information [1]. An important collection of evidence 
suggests that humans construct mental models to achieve 
deductive conclusions [4]. A mental model can be defined 
as an iconic representation of the world that restricts the 
working memory load to a manageable minimum [5]. This 
would happen by abstraction and combination of true 
statements that are derived from given information. A 
further comparison between such statements would yield 
the sought conclusion to a deductive problem or situation. 
This view is proposed by the Mental Models Theory (MMT) 
[1]. The MMT emphasizes the semantic and pragmatic 
variables of reasoning, whereas previous theories were 
focused on syntactic or formal components of human 
thought [4]. Semantic variables are concerned with 
meaning and pragmatic variables are concerned with the 
context in which such meaning takes place. Syntactic 
components are those related to abstract structures and to 
their formal properties. The MMT defines working memory 
as the short-term memory system that regulates reasoning 
[1]. This system would be responsible for the representation 
and inference of deductive processes [4].  
The MMT and other reasoning theories have identified a 
collection of experimental phenomena that are of central 
interest for this study. These phenomena can be broadly 
described as products of a shallow mental processing. The 
term shallow in this paper refers to a weak semantic 
interaction between the new information entered in the 
cognitive system and previous knowledge. In the reasoning 
literature, Rips [6] took the expression shallow processing to 
label heuristic theories of syllogisms and to distinguish them 
from other approaches like the analytic theories or 
comprehension theories [7]. The shallow processing theories 
of reasoning are opposed to the deduction system hypothesis 
proposed by Rips [6]. According to the latter, deduction in 
humans work like a general purpose programming system, 
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that is, an algorithm that applies a finite set of rules [8].  
Three theories that account for shallow processes in 
reasoning were selected for this study to elaborate new 
predictions concerned with logical negation: the matching 
bias, the min-heuristic, and the atmosphere effect.  
The matching bias occurs when the Wason´s Selection 
Task (WST) produce responses critically anchored to 
features that are mentioned in the task instructions [9]. The 
WST is an experimental reasoning task that calls for the 
selection of evidence consistent with a given rule using four 
cards that include specific information in both sides. 
Experimental participants have to select which card or cards 
have to be known by both sides to evaluate the given rule. 
For example, a rule is given: if there is a P on one side of a 
card, then there is a 6 on the other side of the card. Then, 
subjects are presented four several cards that show a P, a 6, 
and alternatives like a Q, and a 5. The task is to decide which 
card or which cards have to be known by both sides to prove 
that the rule is true for the given set of cards. Elaborated 
inferential responses are expected in the WST, but it was 
observed instead that subjects perform a rapid response that 
matches superficial features mentioned in the rule [10]. If P 
was mentioned in the rule, then subjects´ overall responses 
select the P card. Instead of thinking in terms of the 
conditional as logic operator, subjects match the response 
with given superficial information. An extensive analysis of 
several matching bias variants has been proposed by Evans 
[9].  
The min-heuristic account has been introduced in the 
context of the Probability Heuristics Model or PHM 
proposed by Chater & Oaksford [11]. The PHM is an 
explanation that deals with quantifiers in the context of 
syllogistic inference. The min-heuristic account predicts that 
conclusions should take the scope of the least informative 
quantifier presented in the premises of a given syllogism. 
Chater & Oaksford [11] proposed that a minimal mental 
processing is expected when this heuristic is activated.  
The atmosphere effect accounts for a typical conservative 
response modality that preserves superficial features in the 
context of syllogistic inference [12]. The atmosphere effect 
occurs when the quantifiers presented in the premises 
promote conclusions structured by the same quantifiers. 
This phenomenon was first identified by Sells [13], but 
further research has found several variants [1]. The 
atmosphere effect can be understood in a broad sense as a 
sort of shallow persistence anchored to given information in 
syllogistic tasks.  
The general aim of this paper is to introduce a new 
superficial processing phenomenon concerned with logical 
negation. This new shallow phenomenon can be linked in a 
broad sense to the matching bias, the min-heuristic, and the 
atmosphere effect. Although these three previous 
phenomena deal with conditionals in syllogistic inference, 
the present study proposes that a shallow processing also 
occurs with biconditionals in sentential reasoning.  
This paper is organized as follows. First, we introduce 
logical and psychological concepts that are relevant for the 
phenomenon of interest. After introducing definitions for 
sentences and connectives, two particular logical 
equivalences known as DeMorgan´s laws are described. 
These laws are concerned with negation and take the form of 
biconditionals. Then, a recent theory of negation is 
commented and postulated as relevant framework for the 
phenomenon of interest. Finally, we present and discuss an 
experiment that generated evidence concerning the shallow 
processing of DeMorgan´s laws in the context of the MMT.  
2. Sentential Reasoning  
Sentential reasoning is a subfield in the deduction 
research, specifically concerned with the mental processing 
of sentences containing connectives such as and, or, and not, 
among others [1, 14].  
2.1. Sentences and Connectives  
According to mathematical logic [15], a proposition or 
sentence is an expression that can be considered true or 
false but not both. If a truth value cannot be attributed to an 
expression, then such expression is not a sentence. For 
example, a question is not a sentence, even if it makes 
sense in a given language. A sentence can be represented in 
an abstract manner by letters. For example, the sentence 
“London is a city” can be represented by the letter p. 
Similarly, the sentence “Europe is a continent” can be 
expressed by the letter q. Sentences can be combined 
through connectives, which are abstract functions 
expressed through words like and, and or. These words 
operate the function of conjunction and disjunction, 
respectively. An example of conjunction would be “London 
is a city and Europe is a continent”, which can be 
expressed as p and q. Another important connective is 
expressed through the term if…, then…, which is defined as 
the conditional operator.  
The disjunction connective has two variants, the 
inclusive and the exclusive. The inclusive disjunction 
considers that a disjunctive sentence, e.g. p or q is true 
when p is true, or when q is true, or when both p and q are 
simultaneously true. The exclusive disjunction is true when 
either p is true or when q is true, but is false when both p 
and q are simultaneously true.  
Sentences can be further classified as atomic or 
molecular [16]. An atomic sentence is one without 
connectives and without negation. A molecular sentence is 
one that has connectives linking two or more atomic 
sentences, or is a denied atomic sentence.  
Mathematical logic further states that two sentences are 
equivalent when they are syntactically interchangeable. 
Two equivalent sentences express exactly the same idea, 
without information lost or redundancy. Equivalences take 
the form of a biconditional, that is, a relation between two 
structures that mutually imply. If p implies q, and q implies 
p, then p and q are equivalent. This specific relation is 
defined as biconditional [15]. The equivalence in logic is 
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analogous to the equation in mathematics.  
A particularly important operation for sentential 
reasoning is negation. Given the sentence “London is a 
city”, its negation is another sentence that can be expressed 
as, e.g., “London is not a city” or “It is not true that London 
is a city”. Given p, negation returns not p. Negations can 
operate on atomic sentences, but also on molecular 
sentences. The latter has been proved to be extremely 
difficult for experimental participants with no training in 
logic or mathematics [17]. This paper is focused on the 
mental processing of one of these cases, i.e., the negation of 
conjunctions and disjunctions. Such structures are known in 
logic as DeMorgan´s laws.  
2.2. DeMorgan´s Laws 
It can be formally proved that the negation of a 
conjunction is equivalent to an inclusive disjunction, and 
the negation of an inclusive disjunction is equivalent to a 
conjunction. A mathematical proof for both equivalences is 
available in [18]. These equivalences are valid in natural 
language, which can be broadly defined as the ordinary 
language that we employ everyday. English and Spanish are 
examples of natural language. Application examples of 
these equivalences are presented as follows. The sentence 
“It is not true that: London is a city and Europe is a 
continent” is equivalent to the sentence “London is not a 
city, or Europe is not a continent, or both”. Conversely, the 
sentence “It is not true that: London is a city, or Europe is 
a continent, or both” is equivalent to “London is not a city 
and Europe is not a continent”. The formulation of these 
equivalences as logical laws is often attributed to the 
British mathematician Augustus DeMorgan [19], who lived 
and made many important contributions to logic and 
mathematics during the 19th century. Nevertheless, this 
attribution is erroneous because these equivalences were 
well known by medieval logicians like Walter Burleigh, 
who wrote his Tractatus De Consequentiis in 1302 [20].  
In sum, DeMorgan´s law 1 state that sentences of the 
form not (p and q) are equivalent to the corresponding 
sentence of the form (not p) or (not q), or both. 
DeMorgan´s law 2 state that sentences of the form not (p or 
q, or both) are equivalent to the corresponding sentence of 
the form (not p) and (not q).  
2.3. A Theory of Negation 
An extension of the MMT concerned with negation has 
been recently proposed by Khemlani, Orenes, and 
Johnson-Laird [17]. This semantic-driven theory covers the 
meaning, representation, and use of negation. Its core 
prediction postulates that negation is a mental process that 
takes a single argument referred to a single set of 
possibilities and returns the complement of that set. This 
psychological definition replicates in the context of the 
MMT the mathematical theory of sets. A complementary 
set in mathematical set theory can be defined through an 
abstract function that operates on a given set and returns a 
new set formed by the elements that are not included in the 
first set [16]. Complementation in set theory is analogous to 
negation in sentential reasoning. The latter can be 
considered as a particular case of the former.  
The MMT of negation postulates five psychological 
predictions, from which the first one has critical importance 
for this study. Khemlani et al [17] posits that negation 
yields a small scope result. If negation operates on a 
molecular sentence, it is predicted that experimental 
participants would generate responses structured as partial 
negations limited to the corresponding atomic sentences. 
This would happen because a small scope negation 
demands lower mental computations. A corollary for this 
prediction would be that DeMorgan´s laws should not be 
successfully processed by participants with no training in 
logic or mathematics. More specifically, if participants are 
asked to negate a conjunction or a disjunction and to find 
an equivalent sentence, the most frequent responses should 
be structured as small scope negations. For DeMorgan´s 
law 1, composed by sentences of the form not (p and q), the 
predicted response would be (not p) and (not q) instead of 
the correct response (not p) or (not q), or both. For 
DeMorgan´s law 2, composed by sentences of the form not 
(p or q, or both), the predicted response would be (not p) or 
(not q) instead of the correct response (not p) and (not q). 
According to Khemlani et al [17], this would happen 
because a small scope negation demands a lower working 
memory load than a full scope negation. These authors 
further argue that this psychological process is activated 
heuristically, that is, as an automatic cognitive tool that 
operates in a fast and frugal manner [21].  
3. Method 
A within-subjects experimental design was applied to test 
the small scope hypothesis derived from the MMT of 
negation [17]. The particular case of DeMorgan´s laws was 
selected to construct the materials and formulate the 
experimental hypotheses.  
3.1. Participants 
A random sample of 86 undergraduate students of social 
sciences was recruited at a public university located in the 
city of Parana, Argentina. All the participants had no formal 
education in logic or mathematics. The average age was 
24.55 years old (SD = 4.02). Female participants (n = 71) 
represent 82.6 % of the sample.  
3.2. Materials and Procedure 
An experimental task with DeMorgan´s laws in a 
selection paradigm was constructed. Table 1 presents an 
example of the experimental task. Instructions asked 
participants to find the small letters sentence that was 
equivalent to the capital letters sentence. The experiment 
was administered in paper and pencil at the beginning of a 
regular class. All the participants completed an informed 
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consent before starting the experiment. The experimental 
sessions lasted between ten and fifteen minutes.  
In a selection paradigm the task requires to answer by 
selecting one response from a list of several options. The 
selection paradigm is the alternative strategy to the 
construction paradigm, which requires participants to build 
their own responses instead of selecting it from a given list 
of options. The experimental task constructed for this 
experiment included 8 items with 4 response options. Each 
item first presented the negation of a conjunction or the 
negation of a disjunction. Then, the participant was asked 
to find an equivalent sentence for the given negation among 
a list of possible responses. The negation sentence was 
presented in capital letters, and the response options 
sentences were presented in small letters. Instructions 
further remarked that two sentences were equivalent when 
they had the same abstract meaning. Finally, instructions 
mentioned that only one of the four response options was 
the correct response.  
Table 1. Experimental task example. 
IT IS NOT TRUE THAT: LONDON IS A CITY AND EUROPE IS A CONTINENT 
a) London is not a city and Europe is not a continent. * 
b) London is not a city or Europe is not a continent, or both. ** 
c) If London is not a city, then Europe is not a continent. 
d) London is not a city or else Europe is not a continent. 
Note: one asterisk indicates the small scope negation response, which 
would be the product of a shallow processing. Two asterisks indicate the 
correct response. This item applies DeMorgan´s law 1.  
The response options for law 1 were: a conditional (see 
option c in Table 1), a conjunction (option a), an exclusive 
disjunction (option d), and the correct answer (inclusive 
disjunction, option b). The response options for law 2 were: 
a conditional, an exclusive disjunction, an inclusive 
disjunction, and the correct answer (conjunction). The 
atomic sentences linked by these connectives were denied 
in all cases. The sequence of response options within each 
item and the general sequence of items were both 
randomized. The conditional was included as a response 
option because mathematical logic states that a disjunction 
can be transformed into a conditional [16]. Additionally, a 
conjunction can be transformed into a disjunction (applying 
DeMorgan´s laws), which justifies the inclusion of the 
other response options.  
An indexes construction strategy was applied to compare 
all the response options. The Correct-Index was defined as 
the sum of equivalences selection for the corresponding 
DeMorgan´s law. The Transformation-Index was the sum of 
erroneous conditional responses. The Scope-Index was the 
sum of erroneous exclusive disjunction responses. Finally, 
the Surface-Index was defined as the sum of small scope 
negation responses, that is, (not p) and (not q) for law 1 and 
(not p) or (not q) for law 2. These Indexes were defined as 
vectors obtained through the sum of the corresponding 
responses given by each experimental participant to the 
eight items of the task. Indexes for law 1 (four items) were 
calculated separately from indexes for law 2 (four items).  
3.3 Hypotheses 
Hypothesis H1 predicts that the most frequent response 
to DeMorgan´s law 1 items should be the one captured by 
the Surface-Index, that is (not p) and (not q). Hypothesis 
H2 predicts for law 2 that the most frequent response 
should be (not p) or (not q), which is captured by the 
corresponding Surface-Index. Both hypotheses are derived 
from the negation theory of the MMT and justified by 
analogy to the shallow processing observed in other 
reasoning phenomena like the matching bias, the 
min-heuristic and the atmosphere effect. Hypotheses H1 
and H2 are predictions based on the small scope negation 
conjecture proposed by Khemlani et al [17].  
3.4 Results and Discussion 
No significant differences were found between male and 
female participants after Mann-Whitney U test for the 
Transformation-Index (z = -1.234, p = .217, |Cliff´s Delta| 
= .167), the Scope-Index (z = -0.499, p = .618, |Cliff´s 
Delta| = .07), the Correct-Index for law 1 (z = -1.345, p 
= .179, |Cliff´s Delta| = .156), the Correct-Index for law 2 
(z = -1.114, p = .265, |Cliff´s Delta| = .172), and the 
Surface-Index (z = -0.53, p = .596, |Cliff´s Delta| = .086). 
The absence of difference between male and female 
participants in this DeMorgan´s reasoning task is consistent 
with previous studies on verbal reasoning [22].  
Both experimental hypotheses, H1 and H2, resulted 
consistent with the evidence. The overall most frequent 
response was the small scope negation captured by the 
Surface-Index for both laws. Tables 2 and 3 present 
descriptive statistics of each index for law 1 and low 2, 
respectively.  
Table 2. Descriptive statistics of indexes for law 1 
Index Mean Standard Deviation 
Surface-Index 2.99 1.30 
Transformation-Index 0.43 0.79 
Scope-Index 0.34 0.67 
Correct-Index 0.24 0.53 
Table 3. Descriptive statistics of indexes for law 2 
Index Mean Standard Deviation 
Surface-Index 2.23 1.50 
Correct-Index 1.06 1.23 
Scope-Index 0.49 0.86 
Transformation-Index 0.22 0.58 
Tables 4 and 5 present statistical comparisons between 
the Surface-Index and the other indexes for law 1 and law 2, 
respectively. The Sign test was applied in all cases because 
some vectors resulted incompatible with the normality and 
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homogeneity of variances assumption required to perform 
parametric comparisons. A non-parametric effect size was 
further calculated. The Cliff´s Delta effect size was chosen. 
For this effect size, the absolute value was informed 
because the plus or minus polarities depend only on which 
vector was entered first to the algorithm [23]. The smallest 
effect size is associated to zero, whereas the biggest effect 
size is associated to one for the Cliff´s Delta absolute value. 
Table 4. Comparison between Surface-Index and other indexes for law 1 
 Trans-Index Scope-Index Correct-Index 
Hypothesis Surf > Trans Surf > Scope Surf > Correct 
z -7.400 -7.444 -7.938 
p-value < .001 < .001 < .001 
|Cliff´s δ| .844 .863 .883 
Effect size large Large large 
Note: Trans means Transformation-Index, Surf means Surface-Index, 
Scope means Scope-Index, Correct means Correct-Index. All the 
comparisons are between the Surface-Index and the index indicated in 
each column.  
Table 5. Comparison between Surface-Index and other indexes for law 2 
 Correct-Index Scope-Index Trans-Index 
Hypothesis Surf > Correct Surf > Scope Surface > Trans 
z -3.327 -5.539 -6.697 
p-value < .001 < .001 < .001 
|Cliff´s δ| .441 .648 .746 
Effect size medium large large 
Note: see note on Table 4. 
The distance between the Surface-Index and the other 
indexes resulted medium to large. This result suggests that 
the overall response to the proposed reasoning experiment 
can be explained by a shallow processing. A weak semantic 
elaboration might have happened. DeMorgan´s laws 
received a small scope negation processing, as predicted by 
Khemlani et al [17] in the context of the MMT.   
The effect size between the Surface-Index and the 
Correct-Index resulted large for law 1 and medium for law 
2. This asymmetry is also predicted by the MMT of 
negation. Such phenomenon would happen because law 2 
(a conjunction) demands a lower working memory load 
than law 1 (an inclusive disjunction). A recent study 
conducted by Khemlani, Orenes, and Johnson-Laird [24] 
contributed novel evidence for this asymmetric 
phenomenon for the particular case of DeMorgan´s laws.  
4. Conclusions  
Research on reasoning has identified several phenomena 
that can be described as products of a shallow mental 
processing. Three of them are explained through the 
matching bias [9, 10], the min-heuristic [11], and the 
atmosphere effect [12, 13]. These particular cases are 
concerned with syllogisms and conditionals. One common 
element between the three is the weak semantic processing 
of deductive information. This paper aims to introduce a 
novel phenomenon in which the same shallow processing 
occurs for the specific case of DeMorgan´s laws cognition. 
An analogous shallow processing would occur for 
biconditionals concerned with negations. The theory of 
negation formulated within the MMT predicted this result. 
The small scope negation would be produced by the 
spontaneous tendency to avoid working memory overload. It 
seems that the human mind prefers to spare resources insofar 
the environmental adjustment is achieved [1]. A processing 
heuristic described by Khemlani et al [17] as small scope 
negation resulted consistent with the experimental results of 
this study. This would probably happen because responses 
structured according to superficial features seem to be less 
cognitive demanding than a deep re-structuring of sentences 
containing negations of other connectives like conjunctions 
and disjunctions.  
One limitation of this study is concerned with the 
contextual variables neglect. Replications of these 
hypotheses testing in naturalistic contexts are recommended. 
Previous findings suggest that adequate ecological designs 
increase the correct responses frequency [21]. Another 
limitation is concerned with the lack of response time 
measures. A stronger test for the novel phenomenon 
proposed in this paper should obtain shorter latencies for the 
Surface-Index when compared to any other index. This 
would happen if responses captured by such other indexes 
are directly neglected by participants. This result would be 
consistent with the small scope negation conjecture.   
In sum, this paper introduced a novel phenomenon of 
shallow processing in reasoning tasks concerned with 
logical negation. Previous phenomena were concerned with 
conditionals, whereas the present study contributes evidence 
concerning biconditionals for the particular case of 
DeMorgan´s laws.  
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